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by Jay Conison*
Chicago, Illinois
A uretail price ceiling," as the terrn
is used here, is a maximum price
that ( 1) a manufacturer, franchisor or supplier• (2) allows a retailer with whom he is in a
'\ ~~·
..
distributional relationship (3) to
charge consumers (4) for products
_.
t1
._.
_,.J"r "
or services in which the manufac'"'1v·
turer has an interest. Since retail
~~
price ceilings keep prices low and
1·
thereby benefit consumers, there
J
would seem., at first glance, to be
Jay Conison
nothing wrong or improper with them. Yet, under present
antitrust law, retail price ceilings are unlawful per se: they
are always unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 2
and the trier of fact will not listen to justifications.
A well-known trend in recent years has been to construe
and apply the antitrust laws exclusively by reference to eco-.
nomic principles. 3 Advocates of an exclusively economic
approach to the antitrust laws argue, on theoretical grounds
alone, that retail price ceilings should always be lawful or,
at least, that the lawfulness of the practice should be subject
to a rule of reason. 4 To be sure, economic analysis has long
been viewed as a helpful and legitimate method for construing and applying the antitrust laws. However, primary
reliance on it has been rejected by Congress5 and has been
heavily and repeatedly criticized by legal scholars. 6 Moreover, as will be seen below, the prohibition of retail price
ceilings rests almost entirely on a libertarian, rather than an
economic, rationale. Thus, even if the present standard of
per se unlawfulness is unjustified and retail price ceilings
indeed are sometimes reasonable and desirable, theoretical
economic arguments are not likely to be the most compelling ones to effect a change in the law.
There are, however, practical business arguments for softening the ban on retail price ceilings. What is curious about
b.~ · )Cr.~·
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*Mr. Conison is an associate with the law firm of Sonnenschein. Carlin,
Nash & Rosenthal in Chicago. Illinois.

the present state of the law is that retail price ceilings are of
antitrust concern only when they are used in a distributional
relationship. Where there is no distributional relationship where, for example, the party attempting to place a
ceiling on a dealer's retail price can be viewed as a consumer, rather than as a manufacturer there is no per se
violation of section I. 7 Yet, in a distributional relationship,
the manufacturer inevitably has some interest often a legally recognized and protected one in the product or service sold by the dealer and in the manner of its sale. Such
interest may be by virtue of the manufacturer's role, for
example, as a trademark licensor or as a party potentially
subject to liability for defects. Yet that business interest,
which is a precondition of the manufacturer's vulnerability
to antitrust liability, may be an interest which, when examined more closely, justifies some fornt of manufacturer
involvement in the retailer's pricing.
The following discussion shows some of the business interests recognized as permitting manufacturer involvement
in retail pricing, the scope of their present acceptance by
•
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courts, and their potential for further application. First;
though, one must understand how the prohibition of retail
price ce iIi ngs developed.
I. The Rationale and Effect of the
Present Prohibition
In its 1940 decision, United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil
Co../' the U.S. Supreme Court explained its finding of the
illegality of a cartel by stating that ua combination fortned .
for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing,
fixing, pegging~ or stabilizing the price of a commodity in
interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se"' 9 The reference to udepressingn prices was dictum, but it was the first
suggestion by the Court that maximum price fixing, at least
by competitors, might be per se illegal. The suggestion was
made into a rule ten years later in Kiefer-Stewa.rt Co. v. Joseph E. Seagra1n & Sons, Inc. 10 There the Court, relying solely
on the unelaborated dictum in Socony, held that agreements
between competitors to fix maximum prices for the resale

Price ceilings are illegal mainly b·e cause
they '' 'cripple the freedom of traders and
thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment.' ''
•

.

of their products are per se illegal. In the Courfs view, ..,such
agreements . no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability
to sell in accordance with their own judgment.H••
Kie..fer-Stewart . since it involved an agreement to fix resale prices, and because its rationale was protection of the
freedom of traders, suggested a further rule: that a retail
price ceiling imposed by a single manufacturer, even on a
single dealer, might be per se iJlegal. 12 In 1968, the Supreme
Court.. in Albrecht v. Herald Co., u held such a rule to be the
law.
Albrecht was a new~paper case. The Herald Company
granted exclusive territories to independent carriers. To
prevent abuse of the local monopolies it had created, the
newspaper advertised suggested retail prices and provided
in the distributorship agreement that the agreement would
be terminated if prices exceeded the advertised maximum. 14
Plaintiff~ a carrier, raised his prices and, after the paper's
I
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efforts to bring his prices in line failed, his distributorship
was tertninated.
With little ado and less analysis, the Court held that a
. retail price ceiling automatically violates section l of the
Sherman Act. Echoing the language of Kiefer-Stew/art, it
stated that:
Maximum and minimum price fixing may have different consequences in many situations. But schemes to fix maximum
prices.. by substituting the perhaps erroneous judgment of a seller
for the forces of the competitive market, may severely intrude
upon the ability of buyers to compete and survive in that market.•~

The Court rejected the defense, which had been accepted
by the court of appeals, that a price ceiling was necessary to
protect the public from Hprice gougingn by the carriers.
The important result of Albrecht, beyond its mere holding
unlawful of retail price ceilings, was to help make protection
of the pricing independence of retailers the preeminent concern of the Sherman Act. So important was this concern that
the Court held interference with the pricing activity of a
single retailer, irrespective of effect on market conditions,
to violate section 1.
Albrecht should be contrasted with Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 16 the case holding minimum
retail price maintenance to be unreasonable. The Court
there, unlike in Albrecht, reached its conclusion through examination of market impact. In that case, a vast number of
retailers were part of the price maintenance system, and, as
~ consequence, the system had the market effect of a retailer
cartel. 17 The Court had already held that retailer cartels violate the Sherntan Act. 18
Consistent with its concern for market effect, the Miles
Court, in dictum, suggested that a "single transaction, conceivably unr~lated to the public interest," might be upheld.19 But the price-fixing combination in Albrecht was not
marketwide: it arose only between the newspaper and the
plaintiff and only when the plaintiff had violated the suggested prices and the newspaper then sought to compel adhere.nce. As a result, in holding that this combination
violated the Sherman Act, the Court discarded the usingle
transaction" exception and held illegal per se isolated restraints on the pricing discretion of an individual retailer. 20

II. Unacceptability of the Albrecht Rule
to Lower Courts

•

The rule of Albrecht is that any coercive or contractual
restriction by a manufacturer on a dealer's discretion to
charge as much as he wants violates the Sherrnan Act. 21 The
Supreme Court, has not had occasion explicitly to reconsider
the holding, but in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 22 it reaffirnted, in strong dictum, that price ceilings
are illegal, mainly because they "'cripple the freedom of
traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment.' ,.. 23

Notwithstanding the dictum in Maricopa County, the
holding in Albrecht is vulnerable to judicial limitation. Its
weakness is not that it represents bad economic theory.
Rather, the problem is that the decision is based on an untenable view of the nature of marketing and distribution.
Lower federal courts have been uncomfortable with Albrecht s per se prohibition and have groped for reasons that
might justify a manufacturer's restricting the discretion of

A more restrained approach has been taken by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals. There, the court did not analogize
the manufacturer-dealer relationship to some other legal or
economic relationship and did not discover an essentially
unlimited privilege of the manufacturer to participate in retail pricing. Instead, the court took the manufacturer-dealer
relationship for what it was and found a limited domain in
which the manufacturer's control of maximum price was sufficiently justified as not to be barred per se. In Jack Walters
& Son Corp. v. Morton Building, lnc., 28 a manufacturer of
prefabricated farrn buildings often would advertise special
deals, involving reduced prices, directly to consumers. Dealers were given a discount; they were also threatened with
tern1ination if they went above the advertised price, and they
were monitored for compliance. The court held the practic.e
to be perrnissible. In the court;s view, in the context of price
prom:otions, the manufacturer's interest in assuring the truthfulness of the promotions could legitimate substantial control
of the dealers' prices:

'

In the court's view, in the context of price
promotions, the manufacturer's interest in
assuring the truthfulness of the promotions could legitimate substantial control
of the dealers' prices.

dealers to charge as much as they want. In this way, courts
have recognized certain interests of a manufacturer to be so
compelling as to justify interference in a retailer's pricing.
One approach to escaping the per se prohibition was taken
in Consortium. Inc. v. Knoxville International Energy Exposition.~4 There, the defendant was the owner of certain
trademarks. lt licensed one of the plaintiffs to sell products
not manufactured by ·the defendant but marked with the
defendant's trademarks. The licensing agreement provided
that the licensee would. at the outset, obtain the defendant's
approval of a list of maximum prices for goods so marked
and would increase those prices only with the written approval of defendant. The licensee chalJenged the license as
a contract to fix maximum prices. The court not only disagreed, but it granted summary judgment for the defe.n dant,
reasoning that the parties did not enter into a resale arrangement, but instead ••merely entered into a joint venture or
4>partnership' by which the trademark owner shared its
goodwill with the licensee in exchange for a share of profits. ":! 5 A partnership, which by its nature requires parties to
agree on price, does not violate the Sherman Act. 26 Thus,
4
on the court ·s analogical reasoning, the licensor- 'partner''
was privileged to participate in the resale pricing of the
goods. The court thus held the rule of reason to apply to the
arrangement and then held the arrangement legal.
The approach of the court in Consortium 01ay easily be·
generalized. In particular, the reasoning applies to any business format franchising relationship one in which the
franchisor licenses the franchisee to use its trademarks and
business format.:! 7 Consequently, retail price ceilings, when
used in this very common form of distribution relationship,
would virtually be immune from antitrust attack. But it is
doubtful that courts at present wouid allow the rationale of
Cvnsortiu1n to be extended so far.
.

.

.

'

•

If it is lawful to advertise a retail price [as the parties agreed it
was], it should be lawful to take at least the minimum steps nee·
essary to make that advertising beneficial. It would be pretty embarrassing for a manufacturer who had advertised a special retail
price to be bombarded by complaints from consumers that dealers
were refusing to sell them at that price. Such refusals would make
the advertising misleading and might even expose the manufacturer to legal sanctions under the Federal Trade Commission Act
or counterpart state regulations. So if retail price advertising by
manufacturers is to be feasible the manufacturer must be allowed
to take reasonable measures to make sure the advertised price is
not exceeded. These measures include trying to persuade dealers
to adhere to the advertised price and checking around to make
sure they are adhering. These are the respects in which Morton is
alleged to have gone beyond the simple announcement of policy
and refusal to deal with noncompliers that would be perrnissible
even if it were trying to get its dealers to adhere to its suggested
retail prices across the board. They are the minimum steps that
Morton had to take if its advertised price was to have any value
at all, and they are therefore lawful. 29

Thus, a manufacturer has the right to involve itself substantially in dealer pricing during an advertised promotion
where the manufacturer's involvement is reasonably necessary to make the price promotion effective. Unlike the
result in Consortium, the result in Walters is plausible, precisely because it is based on a realistic view of the manufacturer's interest in the retail stage of distribution.
III. The Propriety of Cooperation in
the Distribution Process
Albrecht, like the cases just discussed, is susceptible to a
manufacturer's-interest analysis. In the view of the Albrecht
Court~

manufacturers are merely sellers and dealers are
merely buyers, their relationship not differing essentially
from that of a retailer and its custom.ers. ·under Albrecht, a
manufacturer-seller has no more legitimate interest in what
its buyer-dealer does with goods he buys for resale than a
Summer 1988
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retailer has ·in what a consumer does with goods he buys for
use. As the Supreme Court explained in a contemporaneous
opinion, u[i]f the manufacturer parts with dominion over
his product ... he may not reserve control over its destiny. HJo Such a view of the distribution process leads inexorably to the further view that manufacturers and dealers
naturally tend to become adversaries, because of manufacturers' constant, and presumptively unjustified, attempts to
involve themselves in dealers' decisions as to marketing and
price. In the Albrecht view, manufacturers are meddlers.
But the reasoning in Albrecht simply begs the question. The
Court assumes that, upon sale to a dealer, a manufacturer
uparts with dominion over his product." In particular the
Court presumes that, upon sale to a dealer, the manufacturer

••

Distribution is a process in which the
dealer1 as well as the manufacturer, might
reasonably wish, and even request, that
the manufacturer become involved at the
retail stage.
•

abdicates all interest in the sale of the good to consumers.
But the world is not as Albrecht presumes. Distribution is a
process in which the dealer, as well as the manufacturer, might
reasonably wish, and even request, that the manufacturer
become involved at the retail stage. Cooperation may be
helpful.. if not essential, for the orderly, efficient, and
profitable marketing of the goods and services. For exam pi~.
in order to stimulate or improve a retailer..s perforn1ance, a
manufacturer, with the agreement of a retailer, might provide
training of retail personnel, cooperative advertising programs,
in-store promotions, incentive programs for sales personnel,
seHing aids, and representatives who assist and advise. 31
Contrary to the view of Albrecht, it is cooperation, rather
than conflict, that is the not rn in the distribution process.
The Supreme Court, in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serl'ice Corp.,·n has recognized the importance of manufacturer-dealer cooperation, recognized that it is norrnal, and
recognized that such cooperation must be accounted for in
the antitrust analysis of vertical restraints. As the Court explained, in upholding the propriety of cooperation through
exchanges of inforrnation:
•

[ D]istributors are an imponant source of information for manufacturers. In order to assure an efficient distribution system.
manufacturers and distributors constantly must coordinate their
activities to assure that their product will reach the consumer
persuasively and efficiently. ·':\

The Court then held that antitrust rules should be carefully
drawn so as not to inhibit this proper and important form

of cooperation. 34 But if manufacturer-dealer cooperation is
natural, and if legitimate manufacturer-dealer cooperation
should not be prohibited, or even inhibited, by the Sherman
Act, the basis for the sweeping prohibition of Albrecht is
undermined. For as lower court decisions have come to recognize, resale price ceilings may well reflect legitimate coordination of activities between a manufacturer and its
dealer.
The best example of this is promotional price advertising.
It is widely recognized that price advertising, especially in
connection with promotions, is a legitimate area of cooperation between a manufacturer and its dealers. Cooperative advenising of price by a group of franchisees has long
been recognized as a practice subject to the rule of reason. 35
Furtherntore, courts have held that a manufacturer's funding of promotional discounts to dealers is also subject to the
rule of reason. 36 As Walters recognized, such legitimate cooperation may have the necessary effect of temporarily limiting a dealer's pricing discretion. But the temporary restriction is not illegitimate meddling by the manufacturer; it is
an integral part of the manufacturer's and dealers' legitimate coordination of promotional activity.
Another example of legitimate coordination arises where
a manufacturer, through superior resources, has better
knowledge than the local dealer of how to price and market
goods effectively. The law of resale price maintenance protects the pricing discretion of the local merchant in part (but
not exclusively) because he is presumed to have better information about market conditions and to be able to respond efficiently to changes in competitive conditions. 37 But
where that assumption is unsound, or where the manufac~
turer may at least usefully contribute to the pricing decision,
there may be greater scope for it to participate with the deal38 Greater freedom to become
er in setting maximum
prices.
.
involved in retail pricing has long been recognized to be the
case in consignment relationships where manufacturers are
privileged to dictate prices. 39 Arguably, greater freedom
should be allowed in many franchise relationships as well.
A third example is that of disttibution systems where ongoing, close cooperation between the manufacturer and
dealers is required because of factors inherent in the product or service delivered. Newspapers, for example, may require price ceilings to ensure the circulation penetration
needed for the newspaper to be successfully marketed to
advertisers, and thereby financially viable. 40 A nationwide
restaurant franchisor may require price ceilings to ensure
the maintenance of a moderate or low-price image essential
to consumer appeal. 41 Even a proponent of the strict prohibition of resale price maintenanc~ observes that
[A) firnt, such as a fast food franchisor, which licenses a trade
name and which may sell products to be resold under this trade
name ... has a considerable interest in the resale activities of
franchisees and might be given a right to participate with franchisees in ;>rice making, at least to the extent of suggesting a price
and advertising it. 42
I
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In cases such as these, retail price ceilings may be justified
as a prerequisite to the system s operation and success. 43
9

IV. Should the Present Per Se Prohibition Be Modified?
If one were to put aside the history of Supreme Court
decisions on the subject of retail price ceilings and determine the standard of legality simply in light of contemporary antitrust jurisprudence, then the rule of reason surely
would apply. Albrecht's reasoning to a conclusion of per se
illegality is unconvincing. It is true that a retail price ceiling ···like any other business practice has some potential
for anticompetitive harm. But the principal harm of retail
price ceilings that the Supreme Court identified in Albrecht
is the preemption of dealers' independent judgment, which
may force them to price the affected product at a level that
they believe is too low. Yet preemption of dealer judgment,
as a principal potential harm, for most trade practices jus44
tifies only a rule of reason standard, and for others has
been held to justify per se condemnation only where the
manufacturer has substantial market power and where a sig4
nificant amount of commerce is affected by the practice. s
lnde_ed, in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 46
the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a single transaction cannot be the basis of a tying violation:
If only a single purchaser were "forced'~ with respect to the purchase of a tied item . the resultant impact on competition would
not be sufficient to warrant the concern ofantitrust law. 47

Moreover, the premises which led the Albrecht Court to
its conclusion are unconvincing as welL Contrary to the
Court's presupposition that a manufacturer's involvement
in a dealer's pricing must be officious meddling, retail price

Contrary to the Court's presupposition that
a manufacturer's involvement in a dealer's
pricing must be officious meddling, retail
price ceilings may well be an expression
of the manufacturer's legitimate interest
in cooperating with dealers in order to facilitate distribution of the service or goods.
.

.

..

ceilings may well be an expression of the manufacturer~s
legitimate interest in cooperating with dealers in order to
facilitate distribution of the service or good. As Monsanto
recognized, such cooperation may be an activity to be protected rather than condemned by section l of the Sherrnan
Act.
Even antitrust scholars who advocate a strict prohibition
of retail price floors agree that retail price ceilings should

be treated more leniently. 48 Institutional inertia, however,
may be an obstacle to a complete overruling of Albrecht. The
Supreme Court has stated that well-established per se prohibitions, in particular those relating to price restraints,
should not be abolished•. except by Congress. 49 Yet the prohibition of retail price ceilings, unlike the prohibitions of
cartels and of retail price -floors, is arguably a recent innovation. In addition, unlike those other prohibitions, it is one
that has been almost unanimously criticized by scholars and
one that is troublesome to the lower couns. Its status is like
that of the prohibition of manufacturer-imposed customer
and territorial restrictions in 1977. At that time, the Supreme Court overruled a decision that it had rendered only
ten years prior, which held such restrictions to be per se
illegal. so Overrule of Albrecht thus has some institutional
precedent.
But even if Albrecht is not overruled, its holding should
be cut back. The decision rests on a faulty notion of distribution, in supposing that a manufacturer never has a legit. imate interest in how a produc~ or service is priced for sale
to consumers and in supposing that cooperation between a
-m anufacturer and its dealers regarding price ceilings is never legitimate. The premise is wrong in the case of price promotions and wrong in the case of many franchise relationships. In the cases where manufacturer involvement in retail
pricing reflects norrnal, desirable activity to facilitate distribution, a. rule of reason standard for liab_ility should be
applied.
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A No Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing. 7l G·Eo.
L.J. 1487•. 1490 n.l7 ( 1983).
49. E.g.• Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc~y.. 457 U.S. 332•. 354-55
(1982).

.

50. Continental T.V .. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc .. 433 U..S. 36 ( 1977). Continental T.V. overruled the Court's decision re~ched in United States. v.
Arnold Schwinn & Co .• 388 U.S. 365 (1967).

(I 899).

19. 220 U.S. at 407. Contemporary understanding of the case was that it
did not extend it to i·s olalcd contacts Hunrelatcd to the public interest."
Dunn. Rl·sale Pi-ice A.·laintenancl'. 32 YALE l.J. 6 76. 677 n.8. 679 n.l5 ( 1923 ).
:!0. Sec 390 U.S. at )_62 (Harlan. J .. dissenting).
21. However. a manufacturer may suggest retail prices and noncoercivcly
try to persuade a dealer to follow them . .\·l,e. t~.g.. Gray v. Shell Oil Co.~ 469
F.::!d 742. 748 (9th Cir. 1972). ct•rl. denh~d. 412 U.S. 943 ( •1973).
22. 45 7 u.s. 332 ( 1982).
.
.:!J. /d. at 346 (quoting Kicfcr-Stcwan Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram _& Sons.
I nr .. 340 lf.S. 2J I • .21 3 ( 195 1)).
:!4. 563 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Tenn. 1983).
15. /d. at 60. (.'f: Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co .. 544 F.2d ll84. I J 92-93 (3d
Cic I976). cer1. denil•d. 433 U.S. 908 (1977) (K-Mart and grocery concession that operated in same building under -· ·K-Marf· name were akin to
partners: K-Mart thus <:ould impose contractual restrictions to keep conc~ssionnaire~s pri~cs low).
26. lJ nitcd States v. Joint Traffic Ass·n. 171 lJ .S. 505. 56 7 ( 1898).
27. For a general discussion of this type of business relationship. sec 15
GLICKMAN. fRANCUISJNG § 2.02(2). at 2-11 (1987).
28. 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.). cert. dl•nh·d. 469 U.S. 1018 (19h4).
2q. /d. at 708 (citation omitted).
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We'd like to hear from you
Maybe you agree with the opinions of an author of
one of our articles . Or maybe you disagree~ Perhaps
you would like to express an opinion on a topic of
interest to the franchise bar. The Editor would like to
hear from readers of Franchise Law Journal so that a
regular Letters to the Editor column can be published.
Send your comments to W. M -i chael Garner,
Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, 330 Madison Av~
enue, New York, NY 10017. Every effort will be made
to publish your letter. We do reserve the right, however, to edit for length and style.
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